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THE USE OF SCREENS TO CURE IMPUTED CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST: WHY THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S 
AND MOST STATE BAR ASSOCIATIONS' FAILURE TO 
ALLOW SCREENING UNDERMINES THE INTEGRITY OF 
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
You are a young associate, fresh out of law 
school, hired by a large law firm that deals with 
anything from medical malpractice to construction 
contracts. After working at the firm for several 
years you decide to change firms. You interview 
with a number of firms, but after describing the 
variety of cases that you have worked on over the 
years, the firms admit that they do not want to risk 
hiring you and possibly having to turn down future 
litigation if a conflict of interest arises. The firms 
explain that any conflict you may have with a 
potential client will most likely prevent the entire 
firm from representing that client. Unfortunately 
for you, this is a financial risk the firms are not 
willing to take. 
The use of screens to cure imputed conflicts of interest has been 
an ongoing debate for the American Bar Association (ABA), as 
well as state bar associations. l While competing policy reasons 
have led to different solutions for different states, only a minority 
of states permit the use of screens to cure imputed conflicts of 
interest.2 
Screening has been rejected on the basis of the need to protect 
the confidential nature of the attorney-client relationship? 
However, screening can be a useful method that provides clients 
the opportunity to truly choose their own counsel, as well as 
allowing lawyers greater mobility between firms.4 The practice of 
screening essentially prevents an entire firm from being 
disqualified from representation when one attorney within the firm 
is prohibited from representing a client due to a conflict of 
interest.5 
1. See infra Parts III and V. 
2. DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 607-08 (4th ed. 2004). 
3. See infra Part ILB. 3. 
4. See infra Parts Il.B.1-3. 
5. See infra Parts Il.B.1-2. 
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Under traditional rules pertaining to conflicts of interest, an 
entire firm may be disqualified if one lawyer within that firm is 
disqualified from representing a client because of confidences 
gained in an adverse representation.6 This imputed disqualification 
results from a presumption that knowledge gained by one attorney 
is shared by all other attorneys within that firm. 7 In an effort to 
"rebut this presumption . . . procedures designed to create an 
impermeable barrier to intrafirm exchange of confidential 
information" have been "adopt[e]d" by law firms facing 
disqualification.8 Screens "aim to isolate the disqualification to the 
lawyer or lawyers infected with the privileged information that is 
the source of the ethical problem, and thereby to allow other 
attorneys in the firm to carry on the questioned representation free 
of any taint of misuse of confidences.,,9 Effective screening 
requires law firms to erect timely screens that are strictly enforced 
in order to protect client confidences and prevent 
disqualification. 10 A law firm using a screen is responsible for 
ensuring that the screen effectively protects a client's confidential 
information. II 
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (ABA Model 
Rules), as well as state rules of professional conduct promote 
lawyers as "representative[s] of clients," and "officers of the legal 
system .... ,,12 The legal profession is deemed to be self-
regulating and the authority of the Model Rules is grounded in this 
unique characteristic,13 but by rejecting the screening process the 
ABA and other state bar associations have demonstrated a distrust 
in lawyers' abilities to truly self-regulate. 
This Comment will first examine the ABA Model Rules 
concerning conflicts of interest,'4 the Ethics 2000 Commission's 
recommendation to allow for screening' '5 and the House of 
Delegates rejection of the amended rule.' Second, this Comment 
will discuss how the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers 
allows for screening under certain circumstances. 17 Third, this 
6. See Comment, The Chinese Wall Defense To Law-Firm Disqualification. 128 U. 
PA. L. REv. 677, 677-78 (1980). 
7. /d. 
8. /d. at 678. 
9. Jd. 
10. See infra Part 1l.B.1. 
II. 7 AM. JUR. 20 Attorneys at Law § 198 (2004). 
12. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Pmbl. § I (2003); See also, e.g, MO 
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Pmbl. § I (2003) (stating that lawyers are 
"representative[sJ of clients," and "officers of the legal system ... "). 
13. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Pmbl. §§ 10-12. 
14. See infra Part Il.A. 
15. See infra Part IIl.A. 
16. See infra Part III.B. 
17. See infra Part IV, 
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Comment will look at other states, Maryland in particular, which 
permit screening to cure imputed conflicts of interest. 18 These 
states will serve as examples of the successful implementation of 
screening procedures. 19 Finally, this comment will demonstrate 
that in failing to adopt screening procedures, the ABA and other 
state bar associations have in fact undermined the integrity of the 
legal profession.20 
II. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE ABA MODEL 
RULES 
The lepal profession is one of continually increasing lateral 
mobility,2 so that lawyers frequently find themselves moving 
between firms during the course of their career?2 This increased 
mobility gives rise to a growing number of conflicts of interest 
concerning the representation of fonner and current clients?3 The 
ABA Model Rules concerning conflicts of interest are aimed at 
protecting client confidences during representation and beyond, 
even when one lawyer migrates between finns. 24 Importantly, the 
ABA Model Rules specifically address the importance of the 
confidential nature of the attorney-client relationship.25 
The Preamble to the ABA Model Rules states, "[a] lawyer 
should keep in confidence information relating to representation of 
a client .... ,,26 The theory being that in order to zealously 
represent a client and encourage full disclosure, a lawyer must 
guarantee complete confidentiality throughout the course of 
representation and beyond.27 
A. ABA Model Rules 1.9 & 1.10 
ABA Model Rule 1.9 addresses the responsibility that an 
attorney has to fonner c1ients?8 Rule 1.9(b) states: 
A lawyer shall not knowingly represent 
a person in the same or a substantially 
18. See infra Part V. 
19. See infra Part V. 
20. See infra Parts VI-VII. 
21. See Robert A. Creamer, Three Myths About Lateral Screening. 13 THE PROF. 
LAW. 20 (2002) (stating tbat opponents of screening have often "characterized 
lateral lawyers as 'side-switching' lawyers"). 
22. RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 2, at 606-07. 
23. See id. at 607. 
24. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 & 1.10 (2003); see 
also id. R. 1.9 cmts. 4-9 (addressing the meaning of Rule 1.9 as it relates to 
lawyers moving between firms). 
25. See id. R. 1.6. cm!. 
26. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Pmbl. 
27. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCTR. 1.6. cmts. 1,2, 17. 
28. See id. R. 1.9(b). 
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related matter in which a fum with 
which the lawyer fonnerly was 
associated had previously represented a 
client 
(1) whose interests are materially 
adverse to that person; and 
(2) about whom the lawyer had 
acquired infonnation protected by 
Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to 
the matter; unless the fonner client 
gives informed consent, confumed in 
writing?9 
[Vol. 35 
By limiting a lawyer's ability to represent certain persons, 
Rule 1.9 attempts to protect clients from worrying that information 
they disclose to their attorney could later be used against them in 
another matter. 30 Rule 1.10 goes even further to protect client 
confidences by limiting a law firm's ability to represent certain 
persons when an attorney within the firm is individually 
disqualified from representing a client. 3 ! 
In particular, ABA Rule 1.10 addresses the issue of imputation 
of conflicts of interest, stating that: 
When a lawyer has tenninated an 
association with a fum, the fum is not 
prohibited from thereafter representing 
a person with interests materially 
adverse to those of a client represented 
by the formerly associated lawyer and 
not currently represented by the fum 
unless: the matter is the same or 
substantially related to that in which the 
formerly associated lawyer represented 
the client; and 
(2) any lawyer remaining in the fum 
has information protected by Rules 1.6 
and 1. 9( c ) that is material to the 
matter.32 
Rules 1.9 and 1.10 are designed to ensure that attorneys remain 
loyal to their clients.33 Additionally, Rule 1.10(c) allows for 
29. !d. 
30. Id. R. 1.9; see also id. R. 1.9 em!. 8 (stating, in part, that "[pJaragraph (e) 
provides that infonnation acquired by the lawyer in the course of representing a 
client may not subsequently be used or revealed by the lawyer to the 
disadvantage of the client"). 
31. See id. R. l.l Ora). 
32. Id. R. I.10(b). 
33. See id. R. 1.9 cmt. & R. 1.1 0 cmts. 2-3. 
2006) Screens to Cure Imputed Conflicts 371 
removal of imputation if the former or affected client gives 
informed consent;34 however, there are some situations where the 
conflict of interest is considered so severe that a client's informed 
'11 h . . 35 consent WI not remove t e ImputatIOn. 
B. Screening-The "Chinese Wall" Defense 
A screen is a method which can address the risk that is created 
by attorneys who desire to migrate between firms. 36 Specifically, 
"[l]aw reformers borrowed the concept of the 'Chinese Wall,' an 
institutional mechanism long used in banks, securities, and 
investment banking firms to segregate functions among separate 
departments and to insure that confidential information in one did 
not find its way into another.,,37 Although a primary concern 
relating to screening is whether it is really an effective measure to 
protect client confidences,38 it is clear that disqualification is a 
drastic measure that interferes with a client's right to choose 
counse1.39 
34. See id. R. 1.I0(c). Comment e to Rule 1.10 provides that informed consent 
"denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the 
lawyer has communicated adequate infonnation and explanation about the 
material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of 
conduct." ld. R. 1.10 cmt. e. Specifically, Rule I.IO(c) allows for the affected 
client to waive the imputation by giving infonned consent under the requirements 
set forth in Rule l.7(b). ld. R. l.l O( c). Rule I. 7(b), in tum, provides that even if 
a concurrent conflict of interest exists the lawycr may still represent the client if: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to 
provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client; 
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law; 
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim 
by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the 
same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and 
(4) each affected client gives infonned consent, confinned in 
writing. 
Id. R. l.7(b). 
35. See id. R. 1.10 cmt. 6 (stating that "[i)n some cases, the risk may be so severe that 
the conflict may not be cured by client consent"). With respect to client waivers 
of future conflicts, comment 6 references comment 22 of Rule 1.7. See id. 
Comment 22 explains that the risk is too severe when the consent is broad and 
not specific, "because it is not reasonably likely that the client will have 
understood the material risks involved." See id. R. 1.7 cmt. 22. In these cases 
the consent will be deemed ineffective. See id. 
36. Susan P. Shapiro, Bushwacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of Interest in the 
Practice of Law and Real Life, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 87, 156 (2003). 
37. Jd. 
38. Id. at 159. 
39. See Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Ref. Co., 688 N.E.2d 258 (Ohio 1998). In 
Kala, the Ohio Supreme Court held that an attorney who switched sides while an 
appeal was still pending could not be effectively screened in order to prevent 
disqualification of the entire finn. See id. at 268. Although the court closely 
analyzed the facts of this particular case in order to avoid an unnecessary 
disqualification, it ultimately held that "under this set of egregious facts, the 
appearance of impropriety was so great that the attempts made by [the finn 
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1. The Presumption of Shared Confidences 
There is a rebuttable presumption that knowledge obtained by 
one attorney is shared by all of the other attorneys at that lawyer's 
firm.4o The "presumption of shared confidences" exists when an 
attorney has previously represented a client with interests adverse 
to a potential or current client at that attorney's current firm "in a 
substantially related matter.''''' The presumption of shared 
confidences imputes one attorney's disqualification to all other 
attorney's in the new firm;42 however, the new firm may be able to 
rebut the presumption by erecting a timely and effective screen.43 
2. Effective Screening 
The "Chinese Wall" defense allows a firm to rebut the 
presumption that information communicated between a client and 
one attorney is automatically shared with all of the other attorneys 
in the firm.44 An effective screen blocks the attorney creating the 
conflict from obtaining or sharing any knowledge with regard to 
the particular case.45 Certain factors to be considered III 
determining the effectiveness of a screen include: 
(1) the substantiality of the relationship 
between the fonner and current 
matters, (2) the time elapsing between 
the matters, (3) the size of the firm, (4) 
the number of attorneys, (5) the nature 
of the disqualified attorney's 
involvement in the fonner matter, (6) 
the speed with which the wall is 
erected, and (7) the strength of the 
wall.46 
attempting to avoid disqualification 1 to erect a Chinese wall were insufficient to 
overcome the appearance of impropriety." Id. 
40. 32 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 224 (1995). 
41. 7 AM. JUR. 20 Attorneys at Law § 198 (1997). 
42. See, e.g., Lee A. Pizzimenti, Screen Verite: Do Rules About Ethical Screens 
Reflect the Truth About Real-Life Law Firm Practice?, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 305, 
310 (1997). 
43. See infra Part II.B.2, 
44. . See 32 AM. JUR. 20 Federal Courts § 224. 
45. See, e.g., Gerald v. Tumock Plumbing, Heating & Cooling, LLC, 768 N.E.2d 
498, 504 (Ind. App. 2002) (stating that the presumption that confidential 
information held by one attorney in a firm is shared with all of the attorneys in 
the firm "can be rebutted by a demonstration that specific institutional 
mechanisms (e.g., Fire Walls) were implemented to effectively insulate against 
any flow of confidential information from the infected attorney to any other 
member of his or her present firm") (citations omitted). 
46. Comment, supra note 6, at 715. 
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Importantly, "[t]he burden is always on the party relying on this 
'Chinese Wall' to demonstrate its existence and effectiveness.,,47 
3. The Use of Screens-Supporters vs. Critics 
Those who are against the use of screens to cure imputed 
conflicts of interest argue that allowing screening compromises the 
integrity of the profession.48 Specifically, critics of screening 
insist that clients need the security that comes with reasonable 
expectations of confidentiality.49 Ultimately, opposition to 
screening methods seems to revolve around one central theme: a 
general distrust of lawyers. 50 In those instances where a lawyer is 
prohibited from representing a client because of a conflict of 
interest, critics of screening believe that disqualification of that 
lawyer's entire firm is appropriate in order to protect that lawyer's 
former client.5l Notwithstanding these arguments against the use 
of screening to cure imputed conflicts of interest, scholars and 
practitioners remain divided on whether individual lawyers should 
be screened or entire law firms should be disqualified when 
imputed conflicts of interest arise.52 
Those in favor of using screening to avoid disqualification of an 
entire firm rebut critics' concerns with important policy issues 
regarding an individual's right to choose their own counse1.53 
While proponents of screening argue that there is very little 
evidence that former clients have been harmed when screening 
mechanisms are put in place, 54 the effect on current clients is 
obvious and detrimental.55 Clearly, a current client may be 
prohibited from having the representation he desires; moreover, if 
representation has already commenced, "the innocent client suffers 
47. 7 AM. JUR. 20 Attorneys at Law § 198 (1997). 
48. See, e.g., John Gibeaut, Screening Not Enough to Avoid Firm's Disqualification, 
1 A.B.A. J. eReport 36 (2002) (LexisNexis). 
49. See id. 
50. Creamer, supra note 21, at 21. 
5l. See Pizzimenti, supra note 42, at 318; see a/so Margaret Graham Tebo, A 
Treacherous Path, 86 A.B.A. J. 54 (2000). 
52. See Pizzimenti, supra note 42, at 306; Tebo, supra note 51, at 55. 
53. See, e.g., Creamer, supra note 21, at 21 (asserting that "[flor every imputed 
disqualification based on the rejection of screening, there is a client that loses its 
lawyer of choice ... [a]nd the harm to this client is real, not theoretical"); 
Comment, supra note 6, at 679 (stating that "[d]isqualification restricts the 
client's right to counsel of its own choice, delays the resolution of litigation, and 
subjects the client to higher costs"). 
54. See Creamer, supra note 21, at 21. 
55. Not only do overly strict ethical rules restrict an attorney's employment 
opportunities, they restrict the availability of legal services. Lawyers and firms 
will be inclined to refuse to accept representation of smaller clients with matters 
that do not generate substantial fees for fear that they would be forced to reject 
more lucrative representation in the future. See Pizzimenti, supra note 42, at 314. 
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the cost, disruption and delay resulting from imputed 
disqualification. ,,56 
While disqualification certainly harms the current client, 
proponents of screening also argue that disqualification has 
become a tactical step, rather than a genuine attempt to protect a 
former client when a conflict of interest arises.57 Since 
disqualification has been used as a tool in the litigation process,58 
"judges must exercise caution not to paint with a broad brush 
under the misguided belief that coming down on the side of 
disqualification raises the standard of legal ethics and the public's 
respect. ,,59 Proponents of screening further assert that attorneys are 
aware of the severe consequences that an attorney faces as a result 
of sharing confidences, so a motion for disqualification is usually 
"a tactical effort to force the other side to switch firms in 
midstream, rather than a move based on genuine concern that 
confidential information may be disseminated. ,,60 While it is 
argued that disqualification has generally become no more than a 
tactical effort,61 proponents of screening also assert that screening 
would provide greater mobility for attorneys.62 
Those in favor of screening also emphasize the burden that 
imputed disqualification puts on a lawyer's mobility in a day and 
age when attorneys are constantly changing affiliations for a 
variety of reasons.63 Proponents view screening as a balance 
56. See Creamer, supra note 21, at 21. 
57. Tebo, supra note 51, at 55 ("[P]roponents of screening say an even bigger 
concern is that some clients will lose their counsel of choice if an adverse party 
uses disqualification as a tactical measure."). 
58. See Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrumcnt Co., 689 F.2d 715, 722 (7th Cir. 
1982). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered a 
motion for disqualification with great scrutiny, noting that while some motions to 
disqualify counsel are legitimate and imperative, others merely serve the purpose 
of interrupting the litigation process and disrupting one's adversary. Id. 
Specifically, the court stated that "[motions to disqualify counsel] should be 
viewed with extreme caution for they can be misused as techniques of 
harassment." Id. 
59. Panduit Corp. v. Allstate Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (holding that screening is merely one method by which a firm may rebut 
the presumption of shared confidences in order to avoid imputed 
disqualification). 
60. Tebo, supra note 51, at 56. 
61. See, e.g., supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
62. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
63. See Creamer, supra note 21, at 22 ("[T]he inflexible application of the rules of 
imputed disqualification without recognition of appropriate screening unduly 
restricts the ability of this large group of private lawyers to find new positions. "); 
Gibeaut, supra note 48 ("[Disqualification] discourages lawyers from changing 
jobs. "); Shapiro, supra note 36, at 140 ("Other conflicts arise as lawyers move 
from job to job, and as law firms hire and fire attorneys, and merge with one 
another."); Tebo, supra note 51, at 55 ("[T]oday, the legal profession, like the rest 
of the business world, is much more fluid, and lawyers are likely to change firms 
several times during their careers."). 
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between competing policy concerns, so that the confidences of 
fonner clients are protected without depriving current clients of 
their choice of counsel, or lawyers the ability to change jobs.64 
Although the practice of screening has not always received 
much support from the courts,65 the ABA's Ethics 2000 
Commission was persuaded that screens can be an effective 
method for curing conflicts.66 
III. REVISING THE ABA'S CONFLICT OF INTEREST RULES 
A. Ethics 2000 Commission 
In 1997, the Ethics 2000 Commission (the Commission) was 
fonned in order to review the ABA Model Rules and suggest 
modifications.67 The Commission was the first thorough review of 
the Rules since their adoption in 1983.68 The Commission looked 
at the rules concerning conflicts of interest and proposed an 
amendment to Rule 1.10, which would allow for screens to cure 
imputed conflicts of interest.69 
The proposed amendment was drafted as subsection (c) of Rule 
1.10 and stated: 
(c )When a lawyer becomes associated 
with a finn, no lawyer associated in the 
fmn shall knowingly represent a person 
in a matter in which that lawyer is 
disqualified under Rule 1.9 unless: (1) 
the personally disqualified lawyer is 
timely screened from any participation 
in the matter and is apportioned no part 
of the fee there from; and (2) written 
notice is promptly given to any affected 
former client to enable it to ascertain 
compliance with the provisions of this 
64. See Creamer, supra note 21, at 21-22 ("Lateral screening would provide 
protection for the legitimate concerns of the clients of the lateral's former firm 
without inflicting the undeserved punishment of imputed disqualification on the 
innocent second client."). 
65. See 32 AM. JUR. 20 Federal Courts § 224 (1995). 
66. See infra Part lILA. 
67. See American Bar Association, Ethics 2000 Commission, 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html(last visited Jan. 18,2006). 
68. See Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Foreword to Ethics 2000 and Beyond: Reform or 
Professional Responsibility as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1173, 1174 (2003) 
("Although various changes have been made to these rules since their inception 
in 1983, Ethics 2000 represented the first attempt to evaluate the Model Rules in 
their entirety."). 
69. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(c) (Proposed Rule 2001), 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-ruleII0.html(last visited Jan. 18,2006). 
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Rule.70 
Additionally, the proposed comment number six following Rule 
1.1 O( c) read inter alia, as follows: "[ w ]here the conditions of 
paragraph (c) are met, imputation is removed, and consent to the 
new representation is not required. Lawyers should be aware, 
however, that courts may impose more stringent obligations in 
ruling upon motions to disqualify a lawyer from pending 
litigation.,,71 The proposed comment also states that while the rule 
does not prohibit the disqualified attorney from receiving a salary 
or partnership share that was established by a prior agreement, the 
attorney may not receive any other compensation directly related 
to the representation from which the lawyer has been screened.72 
The comment additionally specifies that when notice to the clients 
is required, it should include a description of the disqualified 
lawyer's prior representation, as well as a description of the 
screening mechanisms that have been instituted.73 
Perhaps most helpful in understanding the Commission's 
reasoning is the Reporter's Explanation memo, which 
accompanied the proposed amendment to Rule 1.1 O( c), as well as 
the proposed comment. The memo stated, in part: 
70. ld. 
The Commission is persuaded that 
nonconsensual screening in these cases 
adequately balances the interests of the 
former client in confidentiality of 
information, the interests of current 
clients in hiring counsel of their choice 
(including a law firm that may have 
represented the client in similar matters 
for many years) and the interests of 
lawyers in mobility, particularly when 
they are moving involuntarily because 
their former law firms have 
downsized, dissolved or drifted into 
bankruptcy. There are presently seven 
jurisdictions that permit screening of 
laterals by Rule. The testimony the 
Commission has heard indicates that 
there have not been any significant 
numbers of complaints regarding 
71. See id. em!. 6. 
72. Jd. ernt. 7. 
73. Jd. ernt. 8. 
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lawyers' conduct under these Rules. 7 4 
The Explanation memo clearly states that the Commission 
considered the competing policy concerns with regard to screening 
and found that this method was an acceptable, perhaps an even 
more favorable, alternative to disqualification.75 Unfortunately, 
the ABA House of Delegates was not persuaded by the 
Commission's findings.76 
B. House of Delegates' Rejection of the Commission's Proposal 
The House of Delegates is the policy-making body of the 
ABA,77 and any changes to the Model Rules must be approved by 
the House.78 The ABA House of Delegates met in August of 2001 
to debate amendments to the Model Rules, and the House vote on 
the new amendments was completed in February 2002.79 In order 
to vote on the new amendments, the ABA House of Delegates 
considered the Commission's report,80 which included the 
Reporter's Explanation memo for each rule for which an 
amendment was proposed.81 Additionally, a Minority Report was 
filed by one commissioner who dissented to several of the 
proposed amendments. 82 Despite the findings of the Ethics 2000 
Commission, the proposed Rule 1.1 O( c) was not included among 
the changes made to the ABA Model Rules.83 
74. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (Reporter's Explanation of Changes 
200 I), http://www.abanet.orglcpr/e2k-rule110rcm.html (last visited Jan. 18, 
2006). 
75. Jd. 
76. See infra Part III.B. 
77. See American Bar Association, ABA Leadership, 
http://www.abanet.orglleadership/delegates.html(last visited Jan. 18,2006). 
78. LISA G. LERMAN & PH1LIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF 
LAW 23 (2005). 
79. American Bar Association, Ethics 2000 Commission, 
http://abanet.orglcpr/ethics2k.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2006). 
80. Jd. 
81. See American Bar Association, Ethics 2000 Commission, 
http://abanet.orglcpr/ethics2k.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2006). 
82. Lawrence J. Fox, Minority Report, http://www.abanet.orglcpr/e2k-dissent.html 
(last visited Jan. 18, 2006). 
This dissent is filed, therefore, in the hope that matters raised 
here, while they failed to persuade a majority of my fellow 
Commissioners, will find a more hospitable reception on the floor of 
the House, be the subject of amendments at that time, and result in 
successful appeals from my failure of advocacy in the 'court' below. 
Id. 
83. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 0 (2003) ("A disqualification 
prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under conditions 
stated in Rule 1.7"), with American Bar Association, Ethics 2000 Commission, 
http://abanet.orglcpr/e2k-rulellO.html(last visited Jan. 18, 2006) (stating that a 
lawyer shall not knowingly represent a client if the lawyer is disqualified under 
Rule 1.9, unless: 1) the lawyer is timely screened and will not receive a portion of 
the fee; and 2) written, timely notice is given to the client). 
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In the Minority Report submitted by Commissioner Lawrence J. 
Fox, he urged the House of Delegates to recognize that the 
proposed amendment to Rule 1.10 permitted the use of screens, 
which failed to truly protect client confidentiality.84 The Report 
quotes from the Preamble of the ABA Model Rules, reiterating that 
the legal profession is self-regulating.85 The Minority Report then 
goes on to argue, however, that lawyers may not be trusted to 
actually self-regulate when given the opportunity.86 Specifically, 
Commissioner Fox argues that client confidences will not be 
sufficiently protected when the responsibility of enforcing screens, 
or reporting screening violations, is left solely to the lawyers 
involved in the conflict.87 
The Minority Report states that "[r]arely if ever will violation 
of a screen be communicated to the former client whose 
confidences it is intended to protect. A breach of a screen easi7s 
could be inadvertent, and lawyers may hesitate to report it." 8 
Furthermore, the Minority Report argues that "[t]he change in the 
rule also will place a burden on the affected client to enforce 
lawyer loyalty through the expense of a motion, when a rule would 
mandate lawyer compliance.,,89 Here, the Minority Report seems 
to suggest that rules mandating a lawyer's compliance are effective 
in regulating a lawyer's actions, or protecting clients' interests.9o 
On the other hand, the Report simultaneously argues that a rule 
permitting screening, while still mandating a lawyer's 
responsibility to protect confidential communications, would 
essentially prove ineffective.91 
The Minority Report also criticizes the proposed amendment to 
Rule 1.1 O( c) particularly because the new rule would afford no 
extra protection to a client whose lawyer "switch[ es] sides" during 
the course of representation. 92 Despite Commissioner Fox's strong 
opposition to the use of screens as permitted by the proposed 
amendment to Rule 1.10, the Commissioner cites the Restatement 
of the Law's rule permitting screening as a more acceptable 
84. See Fox, supra note 82. 
85. Id (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Pmb!. § 12 (2003)). 
86. See id 
87. See id "Whom did the commission expect to complain-firms that have used 
screens, either in jurisdictions that pennit them or in situations of client consent? 
Did the commission really expect firms to confess to negligence or worse, with 
loss of business and lawsuits to follow? Really?" ld (quoting Professor Andrew 
Kaufman, Address at the Michael Frank Lecture (June 1,2001)). 
88. Id 
89. Id. 
90. See id. 
91. See id. 
92. See id 
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compromise.93 This reasoning suggests that some form of 
screening may even be acceptable to such an opponent of the 
Ethics 2000 Commission's proposa1.94 
IV. THE RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 
PROMOTES SCREENING 
The American Law Institute (ALI) began drafting a 
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers in 1986, and 
completed it in 1998.95 The Restatement, although not binding, 
combines general principles of ethics pertinent to practicing 
attorneys.96 
Moreover, it is essentially consistent with the ABA Model 
Rules with regard to conflicts of interest97 and imputation,98 with 
93. See id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 
124(2)(a) (2000». Commissioner Fox notes that there are certain jurisdictions 
that prohibit nonconsensual screening in instances where an attorney switches 
sides during the course of representation, but still allow for nonconsensual 
screening in other situations. See id. He argues that "[t)his explains why the 
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers Section 124 recognizes 
nonconscnsual screening only if 'any confidential [sic) information 
communicated to the personally prohibited lawyer is unlikely to be significant in 
the subsequent matter.' The Commission's proposal travels far beyond any such 
limitation." fd. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 
§124). See also infra note 110 and accompanying text. 
94. See Fox, supra note 82. 
95. THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT AND OTHER SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
359 (2004). 
96. See id. 
97. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 121-122, 
132 (2000), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.I.I 0 (2003). Section 132, 
entitled "A Representation Adverse to the Interests of a Former Client," states: 
Unless both the affected present and former clients consent to the 
representation under the limitations and conditions provided in § 122, 
a lawyer who has represented a client in a matter may not thereafter 
represent another client in the same or a substantially related matter 
in which the interests of the former client are materially adverse. The 
current matter is substantially related to the earlier matter if: 
(I) the current matter involves the work the lawyer performed 
for the former client; or 
(2) there is a substantial risk that representation of the present 
client will involve the use of information acquired in the course 
of representing the former client, unless that information has 
become generally known. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132. 
98. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 123, with 
MODEl RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.1.l0. Section 123, entitled, "Imputation of 
a Conflict of Interest to an Affiliated Lawyer," statcs: 
Unless all affected clients consent to the representation under the 
limitations and conditions provided in § 122 or unless imputation 
hereunder is removed as provided in § 124, the restrictions upon a 
lawyer imposed by §§ 125-135 also restrict other affiliated lawyers 
who: 
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the exception that the Restatement permits screening as a means 
for removing imputation.99 Section 124 of the Restatement, 
entitled "Removing Imputation," states that imputation can be 
cured if the lawyer creating the conflict is screened from 
participating in the representation of the client, provided that 
timely and ade~uate notice of the screening is provided to any 
affected client. 1 0 Although section 124 does permit the use of 
screens to cure imputed conflicts of interests, section 124(2)(a) 
places one important limitation on the use of screens. IOI That 
subsection suggests that a screen should only be used to cure an 
imputed conflict of interest when "any confidential client 
information communicated to the personally prohibited lawyer is 
unlikely to be significant in the subsequent matter .... ,,102 The 
Restatement's rule regarding the use of screens does not go as far 
as the Ethics 2000 Commission's proposed amendment to Rule 
1.10 attempted to go,103 but section 124 does go further than the 
current ABA Model Rules. 104 Specifically, the Restatement 
promotes the use of screens, as long as there are safeguards to 
protect affected clients,lOS 
Despite the ABA House of Delegates's rejection of the Ethics 
2000 Commission's proposal to amend Model Rule l.1O,106 some 
states have taken action and amended their state model rules to 
permit the use of screens. 1 07 
(I) are associated with that lawyer in rendering legal services to 
others through a law partnership, professional corporation, sole 
proprietorship, or similar association; 
(2) are employed with that lawyer by an organization to render 
legal services either to that organization or to others to advance 
the interests or objectives of the organization; or 
(3) share office facilities without reasonably adequate measures 
to protect confidential client information so that it will not be 
available to other lawyers in the shared office. 
REST A TEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LA WYERS § 123. 
99. !d. § 124(2)-(3). 
100. Jd. § 124(2)(b)-(c). 
101. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 124(2)(a). Requiring 
that any confidential information communicated to the personally prohibited 
lawyer be insignificant in the subsequent matter creates another safeguard 
protecting the client's confidential communications. Id. 
103 See supra Part liLA. 
104. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 124 
(promoting screens), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2003) (no 
promotion of screens). 
105. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 124(2)-(3). 
106. See supra Part 111.8. 
107. See infra Part V. 
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V. STATES THAT PERMIT SCREENING TO CURE 
IMPUTED CONFLICTS 
381 
Although most states have adopted the ABA Model Rules, or 
have derived their own rules from the ABA's Model Rules or 
Model Code,108 a minority of states have chosen to depart from the 
ABA Model Rules on the subject of screening. 109 
A. Maryland Rule 1.1O(b) Permits the Use afScreens 
Prior to the rejection of the Commission's proposal by the ABA 
House of Delegates, Maryland adopted a rule permitting screening 
in conflicts cases. Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 
(MRPC) 1.1 O(b) provides, in pertinent part: 
When a lawyer becomes, associated 
with a fIrm, the fIrm may not 
knowingly represent a person in the 
same or a substantially related matter in 
which that lawyer, or a fIrm with which 
the lawyer was associated, had 
previously represented a client whose 
interests are materially adverse to that 
person unless: 
(1 ) the newly associated lawyer has 
acquired from the former client no 
information protected by Rules 1.6 and 
(2) 1.9(b) that is material to the matter; 
or the newly associated lawyer is 
screened from any participation in the 
matter and is aRf0rtioned no part of the 
fee therefrom. I 
This rule effectively states that a disqualifIed lawyer is screened 
if that lawyer is isolated from all material knowledge concerning 
the matter, isolated from all contact with the client, and precluded 
from discussing the matter with any other individual at the fIrm. III 
Maryland's rule permitting screens, Rule 1.10, was amended to 
include the language quoted above on December 16, 1999, and the 
new rule became effective on January 1,2000.112 The comment to 
this rule provides insight into the policy reasons which persuaded 
\08. Richard J. Magid, Suing Your Own Client: Disqualification? Don't Be So Sure, 
29 LITIG. 41 (2003). 
\09. See infra note 128 and accompanying text. 
110. MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(b) (2005). 
Ill. ld. 
112. See id. 
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the Maryland House of Delegates to amend it in order to permit 
screening in certain conflict of interest cases. 113 
There are several competing policy reasons surrounding the 
issue of screening, which the comment to Rule l.1O addresses. 114 
While the comment asserts the importance of a former client 
having security in knowing that the attorney's loyalty is not 
compromised,115 clients should ultimately be free to choose their 
own legal counsel. Additionally, the comment maintains that 
lawyers should have a certain degree of freedom in moving 
between law firms and taking on new clients. I 16 In many cases, 
without the ability to use screens, a lawyer desiring to move 
between firms can be viewed as too great of a risk to hire, if that 
lawyer has the potential to create conflicts of interest in the 
future.1I7 Ultimately, this predicament adversely affects both 
lawyers and potential clients by imposing unnecessary limits on 
each party. 
In Stratagene v. Invitrogen Corp.,118 the United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland evaluated a claim for 
disqualification based on imputation under MRPC 1.10, using a 
two-step analysis; specifically, by applying Rule 1.10(b)(1), then 
Rule 1.1 O(b )(2).119 First, under 1.1 O(b)(1), the court must consider 
whether the prohibited lawyer acquired any information protected 
by Rules l.6120 or 1.9(b)121 that was material to the matter. 122 If 
113. See id. R. 1.10 cm!. 
[IJt should be recognized that today many lawyers practice in 
firms, that many to some degree limit their practice to one field or 
another, and that many move from one association to another several 
times in their careers. If the concept of imputed disqualification were 
defined with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtailment 
of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one practice setting to 
another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel. 
Jd. 
114. See id. cmt. 
115. Seeid. 
116. See id. 
117. Shapiro, supra note 36, at 141, 156. 
118. 225 F. Supp. 2d 608 (2002). 
119. See id. at 613-14. 
120. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(b)(l) (2003). Rule 1.6 mandates 
that a lawyer shall not reveal any information obtained from a client during the 
course of representation "unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure 
is impliedly authorized ... or the disclosure falls within one of the narrow 
exceptions provided for in subsection b of the rule." See id. R. 1.6(a). 
121. See id. Rule 1.10(b)(l). Rule 1.9(b) addresses the duties that lawyers have to 
former clients. See id. R. 1.9(b). Further, the rule prohibits a lawyer who has 
"formerly represented a client" in a certain matter from "thereafter represent[ingJ 
another person in the same or substantially related matter," when the current 
client's interests are "materially adverse" to those of the former client. ld. R. 
1.9(a); see also supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. 
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protected information is acquired, the lawyer's conflict will be 
imputed to that lawyer's new firm, unless the prohibited lawyer 
has been effectively screened. 123 Importantly, the court analyzed 
the comment to Rule 1.1 O(b) and asselied that "the burden of proof 
regarding access to confidential information should rest upon the 
firm whose disqualification is sought.,,124 
The Preamble to the MRPC states that, "[t]he legal profession is 
largely self-governing. Although other professions also have been 
granted powers of self-government, the legal profession is unique 
in this respect because of the close relationship between the 
profession and the processes of government and law 
enforcement.,,125 Maryland's adoption of the screening process 
recognizes the self-regulatory nature of the profession by 
entrusting firms with the responsibility of properly screening 
attorneys who create a conflict of interest. 126 Importantly, this 
process protects against conflicts without automatically 
disqualifYing a lawyer, or a law firm, from representing a potential 
client. 127 
B. Other States Permitting the Use of Screens 
While Maryland's decision to permit screens to cure imputed 
conflicts of interest is certainly not the majority position, fourteen 
other states have also amended their rules of professional conduct 
to permit some type of screening. 128 These rules vary from state to 
state, but generally require that the clients affected receive notice 
of the screening mechanism, and that the screened lawyer is given 
122. See also Siratagene. 225 F. Supp. 2d at 613 (quoting language from Rule 
l.l O(b)(I) requiring that a new lawyer have no infonnation "material to the 
matter"). 
123. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.I0(b)(I); see also Stratagene, 225 F. 
Supp. 2d at 614 (upholding the requirement in Rule 1.l0(b)(I) that conflicts will 
be imputed to finns if a new attorney is not screened effectively). 
124. ld. at 613. 
125. MD. RULES OF PROF'LCONDUCT, Pmb!. § 10 (2005). 
126. See id. R.l.lOcrnts. 9-10. 
127. See id. R. 1.10 crnt. 8. See also id. R. 1.10 cmt. 6 ("Where conditions of 
paragraph e [describing the screening process 1 are met, imputation is removed .. 
. "). 
128. See 17A ARIZ. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.I0(d) (2004); DEL. RULES OF 
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.l0(c)(l) (2005); ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 
1.I0(b)(2) (2004); IOWA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 32:1.7 & 32:1.10 (2005); 
MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(d)(2)(ii); MICH. RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT R. 1.I0(b)(l) (2005); 52 MINN. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 1.10(b)(2) 
(2006); MONT. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.l0(c)(l) (2005); N.J. RULES OF 
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(c)(2) (2006); N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 
1.10(c)(I) (2006); OR. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(e) (2005); 42 PA. 
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.I0(b)(I) (2004); TENN. RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT R. 1.10(c) (2005); WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.I0(b) 
(2005). 
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no part of the profits from that representation. 129 Each of these 
states weighed the competing policy concerns and concluded not 
only that clients should have broad discretion when choosing their 
legal counsel, but also that law finns are capable of creating 
effective screens to protect the interests of fanner and current 
clients. 130 
Each state that has opted to permit some fonn of screening has 
done so in an independent manner, taking whatever steps that state 
felt was necessary to protect clients' interests. l3l 
In Clinard v. Blackwood, 132 the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
demonstrated that although Tennessee's Rules of Professional 
Conduct pennit screening to cure imputed conflicts of interest, 
another, broader limitation on the use of screens exists under the 
Rules. 133 The Court stated that "even 'if there is no actual conflict 
of interest, the court must nonetheless consider whether conduct 
has created an appearance of impropriety. ",134 So, even if the 
screen used does rebut the presumption that confidential 
infonnation has passed from the personally prohibited attorney to 
the rest of the finn, "[t]he 'appearance of impropriety' is therefore 
an indeEendent ground upon which disqualification may be 
based."] 5 Tennessee uses the "appearance of impropriety" 
standard 136 as an additional check when ethical issues arise, in 
order to ensure that client confidences are protected without 
depriving current clients of the representation of their choice. 137 
Pennsylvania has permitted the use of screens to cure imputed 
conflicts of interest for well over a decade. 138 Despite a case of 
129. See Charlotte K. Stretch, State Committees Review and Respond To Model Rules 
Amendments, 15 PROF. LAW. 14, 15 (2004). Specifically, "Minnesota, North 
Carolina and Oregon do not include provisions relating to the apportionment of 
the fee. Illinois, Iowa, and Maryland do not require notice to the client regarding 
the screen." Id.; see also ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(b); IOWA 
RULES PROf'L CONDUCT R. 32:1.10; MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. L10(c); 
MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.I0(b); N.C. REVISED RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT R. !.lO(c); OR. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.I0(c). 
130. See Shapiro, supra note 36, at 1309. 
131. See Stretch, supra note 129, at 15. 
132. 46 S.w.3d 177 (Tenn. 2001). 
133. See id. at 186 (asserting that "[e]thical rules must necessarily be broad and 
flexible so as to have some application in various ethical dilemmas, and the 
appearance of impropriety standard can work well when more specific rules may 
be ineffective"). 
134. /d. at 187 (quoting State v. Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d 309 (Tenn. 2001». 
135. Id. (quoting Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d at 312-13). 
136. Specifically, the "appearance of impropriety" standard considers whether a 
"reasonable layperson" with knowledge of the facts would find that the conflict 
poses a potential and "substantial risk" to one of the clients, or offends the public 
interest. See id. 
137. /d. at 187-88. 
138. See PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 Oeb) (2005). 
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ineffective screening in 1992,\39 the Pennsylvania Rules of 
Professional Conduct continue to permit screening. 140 In 
Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz,141 a 
Pennsylvania law firm attempted to represent competing 
companies at the same time, on the basis that it had supposedly 
erected a "Chinese Wall" so that the respective lawyers workin§ 
for the competing companies were screened from each other. 14 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the firm's actions 
constituted an ethical violation,143 but the court neither criticized 
the concept of screening, nor challenged its validity.144 "Indeed, 
the Maritrans situation is remarkable for its rarity. It is also 
remarkable because, even after Maritrans, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court continued to permit lateral screening pursuant to 
Rule 1.10(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, 
which the Court adopted in 1988.,,145 
Notwithstanding Maritrans, evidence tends to show that few 
complaints have arisen in states that permit nonconsensual 
screening to cure imputed conflicts of interest. 146 The Ethics 2000 
Commission's proposed amendment to Rule 1.10, that is, "to 
139. See Maritrans OP, Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 
1992). In particular, the Supreme Court of PeI1l1sylvania affirmed the trial court's 
determination that, "Pepper [a co-defendant attorney] breached its obligation, 
which was fortified by a specific promise, to keep from Messina [another co-
defendant attorney] that which was learned after the erection of the 'Chinese 
Wall.'" Id at 1287. 
140. See PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(b). Rule 1.10(a) states that no lawyer 
in a firm may represent a client when any other lawyer in the firm "practicing 
alone would be prohibited from doing so." See id R. 1.10(b). Additionally, 
subsection b, addressing the use of screens, states: 
(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may 
not knowingly represent a person in the same or substantially related 
matter in which that lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer was 
associated, had previously represented a client whose interests are 
materially adverse to that person and about whom the lawyer had 
acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is 
material to the matter unless: 
(I) the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in 
the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and 
(2) written notice is promptly given to the appropriate client to 
enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule. 
Id 
141. 602 A.2dat 1281. 
142. See Maritrans, 602 A.2d at 1281 ("[T]he attorneys on one side of this 'Chinese 
Wall' would not discuss their respective representations with the attorneys on the 
other side."). 
143. See id. at 1283-84 (citations omitted) ("Pepper and Messina, as attorneys, had a 
duty to administer properly their responsibilities to respect the confidences of 
Maritrans. "). 
144. See id at 1288. 
145. Creamer, supra note 21, at 21. 
146. See id 
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permit 'screening' of private lawyers moving between law firms," 
undoubtedly resulted, in part, from such lack of evidence. 147 
VI. A NEED FOR CONSISTENCY 
The ABA, as well as state bar associations, espouse the self-
regulatory nature of the profession and enact model rules to protect 
clients, lawyers, and the integrity of the legal profession; 148 yet, the 
rejection of the use of SCreens defeats these very purposes. 149 
Screens allow individuals to choose their representation, as well as 
allow lawyers mobilit6' without compromising their ability to 
represent new clients. 15 
Ultimately, the ABA's rejection of the use of screens 
demonstrates a distrust oflawyers, in their self-regulatory capacity, 
to effectively erect SCreens. 151 Perhaps even mOre unsettling is the 
inconsistent way in which this important ethical issue has been 
analyzed, as well as put into practice. 152 
A. ABA Model Rule 1.11 Permits Screeningfor Government 
Employees 
Those who oppose the use of screens to cure imputed conflicts 
of interest repeatedly argue that screening methods do not 
sufficiently guarantee former clients that their confidential 
communications will be protected when their lawyer migrates to a 
new firm. 1S3 Although the House of Delegates rejected the Ethics 
2000 Commission's proposal to amend Rule 1.10 to allow 
147. See id. 
148. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Pmbl. §§ 10-12 (2003). 
149. See Creamer, supra note 21, at 21-22. 
150. See id. 
lSI. See id. at 20-21. A central argument of those opposed to screening is that lawyers 
cannot be trusted to protect the confidences of former clients. ld. at 21. 
Although the ABA House of Delegates does not provide an explanation for each 
proposed amendment that it adopts or rejects, Commissioner fox's Minority 
Report echoes the general sentiments of those opposed to screening. See 
American Bar Association, Ethics 2000 Commission, hnp://abanet.org/cpr/e2k-
report_home.html (follow 'This document" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 18, 
2006); Fox. supra note 82. In particular, the Minority Report argues that, 
"[r]arely if ever will violation of a screen be communicated to the former client 
whose confidences it is intended to protect. A breach of a screen easi ly could be 
inadvertent, and lawyers may hesitate to report it." ld. The Minority Report 
quickly dismisses the Commission's argument that despite concerns about 
enforcement and reporting, "the commission heard no evidence to suggest that 
these objections have a factual basis in the experience of jurisdictions that permit 
screening." See id. 
152. See infra Part VI.A-B (discu5sing the use of screens for government employees, 
as well as the lack of uniformity between state rules of professional conduct and 
the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct). 
153. See supra Part II.B.3. 
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screening,154 the ABA Model Rules do permit screening for 
government employees. 155 Rule 1.11, entitled "Special Conflicts 
of Interest for Fonner and Current Government Officers and 
Employees,,,156 states that a lawyer who has fonnerly served as a 
government employee is subject to Rule 1.9(C),157 and is prohibited 
from representing a person in a matter in which the lawyer 
participated "personally and substantially as a public officer or 
employee . . . ." 158 With regard to screening, subsection (b) states 
in pertinent part: 
(b) When a lawyer is disqualified from 
representation under paragraph ( a), no 
lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer 
is associated may knowingly undertake 
or continue representation in such a 
matter unless: 
(1) the disqualified lawyer is timely 
screened from any participation in the 
matter and is apportioned no part of the 
fee therefrom; and 
(2) written notice is promptly given to 
the appropriate government agency to 
enable it to ascertain compliance with 
the provisions ~f this rule. I 59 
Additionally, subsection (c) states that a lawyer who obtained 
"confidential government infonnation about a person" while in a 
government position is prohibited from representing "a private 
client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter in 
which the infonnation could be used to the material disadvantage 
of that person.,,160 However, the rule does not impute the 
disqualification to the rest of the lawyer's finn if the disqualified 
lawyer is "timely" screened from the matter and "apportioned no 
part of the fee" from the representation. 161 
Notwithstanding the fact that there is little difference 
between screening a lawyer who migrates between a government 
job and a private finn, and a lawyer who migrates between two 
154. See supra Part III.B. 
155. See MODEL RULES OF PRor'L CONDUCT R. 1.11 (2003). 
156. Jd. 
157. Jd. R. 1.11(a)(I). Rule 1.9(c) addresses a lawyer's duties to fonner clients, and 
prohibits a lawyer who has fonnerly represented a client, or whose current or 
fonner finn has fonnerly represented a client, from using any infonnation related 
to that representation to the disadvantage of the fonner client. See id. R. 1.9( c). 
158. See id. R. 1.1 I (a)(2). 
159. Jd. R. 1.1 I (b). 
160. Jd. R. 1. 11 (c). 
161. Jd. 
388 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 35 
private finns, one practice is allowed by the ABA Model Rules, 
while the other has been rejected by the House of Delegates. 162 
The comments to Model Rule 1.11 explain the policy issues 
involved when dealing with government employees; in particular, 
that screening is pennitted in order to avoid discouraging qualified 
lawyers from entering public service. 163 Although such a policy 
may be important, the theory behind it does not hold Up.164 
Screening has been criticized because individuals are 
skeptical that lawyers can be trusted to keep confidential 
infonnation about a fOIDIer client when it could be used to their 
advantage; 165 however, this argument makes no distinction 
between the trustworthiness of a government employee and a 
lawyer employed by a private finn. It is clear that the opponents of 
lateral screening believe that the risk created when private lawyers 
move between finns is too great to be cured by screening 
mechanisms; however, these same opponents believe that conflicts 
of interest can be adequately cured by screening mechanisms when 
an attorney is moving between public and private sectors. 166 The 
rationale behind the latter reasoning is to encourage mobility from 
private to public employment, yet the conflict remains the same. 167 
While it is important to encourage public service, the distinction 
made between government lawyers and private attorneys, with 
regard to screens, is an injustice of its own.168 Moreover, "[i]f 
fonner government lawyers can be trusted to comply with a 
screening mechanism, then private lawyers can be trusted to do so 
as well.,,169 
162. See id.; see also Pizzimenti, supra note 42, at 312-13 C"[MJost commentators 
discern no reason to distinguish the moral uprightness of government lawyers 
from that of private ones."), infra Part III.B (discussing the House of Delegates' 
rejection of proposed Rule !.lO(c». 
163. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.11 cmt. 4 (2003). "The provisions 
for screening and waiver in paragraph (b) are necessary to prevent the 
disqualification rule from imposing too severe a deterrent against entering public 
service." Id. 
164. The Minority Report attempts to explain the rationale behind the screening 
exception for government employees. Fox, supra note 82. Specifically, it 
explains that 
the conclusion was reached that the government uniquely was a 
different kind of client that might be asked to endure the indignity of 
having its former lawyers screened in order to encourage the best and 
the brightest to undertake public service. That exception reflected a 
noble cause and it remains one today. 
Id. 
165. Creamer, supra note 21, at 20-21. 
166. Id. at 20-22. 
167. ld. at 22. 
168. See id.; see also Pizzimenti, supra note 42, at 312-13. ("[M]ost commentators 
discern no reason to distinguish the moral uprightness of government lawyers 
from that of private lawyers. "). 
169. See Creamer, supra note 21, at 22. 
2006] Screens to Cure Imputed Conflicts 389 
Additionally, ABA Model Rule 1.12 allows for the screening of 
former judges, law clerks, arbitrators, mediators, and other third-
party neutrals to prevent imputed disqualification. 17o In County of 
Los Angeles v. Forsyth, 17l the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit suggested that ethical rules permitting screening for former 
judges should, perhaps, be extended to private attorneys in order to 
confront "[t]he changing realities of law practice" and the 
"harsh[ ness]" of disqualification. 172 Again, if screening is 
permitted for former government employees, former judges, law 
clerks, arbitrators, mediators, and third-party neutrals,173 private 
attorneys should be governed by the same rules. It certainly seems 
that ethical rules created to govern lawyers should generally be 
applicable to all lawyers, all of the time. 
B. A Needfor Uniformity in the Courts 
The lack of uniformity between state model rules of 
professional conduct and the ABA's Model Rules, as well as 
among state and federal courts is also damaging to the integrity of 
the profession. 174 The fact that the drafters of Maryland's ethical 
rules seem to trust Maryland lawyers enough to allow them to be 
screened while the ABA does not generally afford that same right 
170. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.12 (2003). Rule 1.12(c) concerning 
imputation states: 
(c) If a lawyer is disqualified by paragraph (a), no lawyer in a 
firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake 
or continue representation in the matter unless: 
(I) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any 
participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee 
therefrom; and 
(2) written notice is promptly given to the parties and any 
appropriate tribunal to enable them to ascertain compliance with the 
provisions of this rule. 
Id. 
171. 223 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that "the vicarious disqualification of 
a firm does not automatically follow the personal disqualification of a former 
settlement judge," when timely erected screens effectively rebut the presumption 
of shared confidences). 
172. Id. at 996-97. The court stated: "[w]e would nevertheless accept the costs of 
automatic disqualification, if it were the only way to ensure that lawyers honor 
their duties of confidentiality and loyalty. But it is not. A client's confidences 
can also be kept inviolate by adopting measures to quarantine the tainted lawyer." 
Id. at 996. Additionally, the court stated that "[t]he changing realities of law 
practice call for a more functional approach to disqualification than in the past." 
Id. at 997. 
173. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
174. See supra Part VI. While this Comment analyzes how the inconsistencies 
between states' ethics codes, with regard to the use of screens to cure imputed 
conflicts of interest, reflect on the legal profession, it is important to note that this 
is not the only area of substance in which states' ethics codes significantly 
diverge. See, e.g., supra notes 132-37 (discussing the Tennessee "appearance of 
impropriety" standard). 
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to other lawyers,175 calls into question the legal profession's entire 
ethical system. 
When trying to determine ethical standards for lawyers one 
must consider that: 
While most state rules have adopted or 
are derived from the ABA Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct or the ABA 
Model Code, or a combination ofboth, 
they are interpreted and applied 
differently by a variety of federal and 
state courts, as well as by various state 
and local authorities. To further 
complicate matters, some federal courts 
have adopted and apply the Rules of 
Professional Conduct of the state in 
which they sit, while other federal 
courts adhere to national standards of 
attorney conduct promulgated by 
national legal associations, such as the 
ABA. Still other federal courts look to 
state Rules of Professional Conduct but 
are willing to consider national 
standards. 1 76 
It is difficult to comprehend how there can be such great 
variation in ethical standards for one profession. 
Some courts have opened the door to screenin9 procedures when there is no rule permitting the use of screens. 1 7 In Doe v. 
Perry Community School District, a case of first impression 
concerning the use of screens, 178 the Supreme Court of Iowa stated 
that screening can be used in limited situations to cure imputed 
conflicts of interest. 179 Iowa's Rules of Professional 
Responsibility mandate that if a lawyer is prohibited from 
representing a client due to a conflict of interest, that lawyer's firm 
175. See supra Parts V & Vl.B, respectively. 
176. Magid, supra note 108, at 41. 
177. See infra note 182 and accompanying text. 
178. 650 N. W.2d 594, 597 (Iowa Sup. 2002). "We must determine whether a 
screening mechanism known as a Chinese wall is sufficient to allow a law firm to 
eliminate the conflict of an attorney who switched sides of representation during 
the same case." Jd 
179. Jd. at 601. Ultimately, the court concluded that screens can be used to cure 
imputed conflicts of interest, as long as the two matters are not substantially 
related. Jd In determining whether two matters are substantially related, the 
court will consider "the nature and seope of the prior representation, the nature of 
the present lawsuit, and whether confidences may have been disclosed." Jd at 
600 (citing Hoffman v. Internal Med. P.C., 533 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Iowa Ct. App. 
1995)). If the two matters are found to be substantially related then the conflict is 
imputed to the firm, and disqualification is required. Jd. at 60 I. 
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must also decline or withdraw from the representation. ISO While 
the court found that the screen in this particular case was not 
sufficient to prevent imputation because the matters were 
substantially related,ISI the court did suggest that a screen erected 
under the proper circumstances could be effective, I 82 
notwithstanding Iowa's general rule of professional responsibility 
concerning imputed disqualification. 183 
The Doe decision demonstrates that although courts may use the 
ethical rules as the basis for ruling on a motion to disqualify, the 
extent to which the rules are utilized is always subject to judicial 
interpretation. 184 Attorneys may, in fact, be subject to discipline 
for violating an ethical rule, while not necessarily being 
disqualified from representing a particular client. lss Given the 
internal nature of screening procedures, it has been suggested that 
"[t]rial courts can influence the evolution of screening procedures 
through case-by-case adequacy reviews" and "[s]tate supreme 
courts can codify in their ethics rules screening guidelines that 
provide complying firms with a safe harbor from the threat of 
disqualification. ,,186 
Although the Iowa court took a bold step, which will hopefully 
encourage other courts to consider the effectiveness of screens, it is 
also clear that "allowing screening by court decision, rather than 
by a black letter rule, has its own pitfalls. Although the facts in the 
recent Iowa case were clear from any standpoint, they may be 
fuzzier the next time around.,,187 
180. IOWA CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYERS DR-105(E) (2002) ("If a 
lawyer is required to decline employment or withdraw from employment, no 
partner or associate of the lawyer or the lawyer's firm may accept or continue 
such employment."), repealed by IOWA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 32:l.7 & 
32: 1.1 0 (2005) (prohibiting a firm from representing a former client of a former 
associated lawyer only under specific circumstances). 
l8l. Doe, 650 N.W.2d at 60l. In this case, the plaintiffs original attorney switched to 
the defendant's firm in the middle of the litigation, so that even the firm 
representing the defendant stipulated that the matters were substantially related. 
Id. at 596-97, 598. Defendant's counsel argued, however, that even though the 
matters were substantially related, the defendant's entire firm should not be 
disqualified, because a "Chinese Wall" had been erected to protect confidences 
communicated by the plaintiffs to their originallawyer.Id. at 600. 
182. See id. at 601. The court concluded that in this case, because a substantial 
relationship existed between the current and former representation, the 
defendant's law firm must be disqualified. Id. at 599. When there is not a 
substantial relationship between the current and former representation, the court 
will consider whether a screen has been effective in protecting client confidences. 
See id. at 600. 
183. See IOWA CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYERS R. 5-105 (repealed 
2005). 
184. See supra text accompanying notes 178-82. 
185. See In re Wenz, 87 P.3d 376, 380 (Mont. 2004). 
186. Ted Schneyer, A Tale of Four Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences the 
"Ethical Infrastructure" of Law Firms, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 245, 263 (1998). 
187. Gibeaut, supra note 48. 
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The lack of uniformity among courts and among states where 
ethics are concerned poses a great threat to the integrity of the 
profession. 188 In a profession there should be certain ethical rules 
from which no derogation is allowed, and professionals in a 
position to create and amend these rules should strive for 
uniformity. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
After an extensive review, the Ethics 2000 Commission 
recommended an amendment to the ABA Model Rules that would 
permit screening. 189 The Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers 
states that screens can be used to cure conflicts. 190 In writing the 
Restatement, the ALI, described as "a frestigious group of 
practicing lawyers, judges, and academics,,,1 I apparently weighed 
the competing policy concerns surrounding the screening process, 
and concluded that screens can effectively cure conflicts. 192 
Moreover, the few states that do permit screening have yet to 
encounter negative ethical repercussions. 193 It certainly appears 
that: 
[R ]ecognition of the Chinese wall 
defense thus offers a practicable 
solution to a growing problem of 
legal ethics. Without detracting from 
the ethical standards of the legal 
profession, expanded use of Chinese 
walls will help to remove artificial 
obstacles to the job mobility of 
attorneys, private and public, while 
securing to clients the maximum 
right to counsel of their choice. 194 
The lack of uniformity among sources of influence and 
authority such as the courts, state rules of professional conduct, the 
ABA Model Rules, and the Restatement of Law Governing 
Lawyers undermines the integrity of the legal profession.195 
Rules governing lawyers should strive to protect clients and 
promote the integrity of the profession. Notwithstanding the 
relative lack of problems arising from the use of screens in the 
188. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text. 
189. See supra Part III.A. 
190. See discussion supra Part IV. 
191. See MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 95, at 359. 
192. See discussion supra Part IV. 
193. See supra Part V.A-B. 
194. Comment, supra note 6, at 715. 
195. See discussion supra Part VI.B. 
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sixteen states which permit them to cure conflicts,196 other states 
have been reluctant to follow in the footsteps of those states. 197 
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers promotes the 
use of screens,198 and the Ethics 2000 Commission found screens 
to be an effective method for curing conflicts before resorting to 
disqualification. 199 The ABA Model Rules permit screening for 
former government employees, judges, law clerks, arbitrators, 
mediators, and other third-party neutrals, but decline to allow the 
same rule to apply to private lawyers?OO At the same time, state 
and federal courts look to varying national and state ethical 
standards when evaluating potential misconduct.201 
While opponents of screening suggest that such a practice will 
undermine the integrity of the profession and create the appearance 
of impropriety,202 they also promote the various duties of lawyers 
and the self-regulatory nature of the profession.203 This lack of 
uniformity and clear distrust of lawyers' abilities to construct and 
respect screens directly conflicts with the goals and principles as 
stated in the ABA Model Rules?04 It is, in fact, these actions 
which undermine the integrity of the profession. 
196. See discussion supra Part V.A-B. 
197. See discussion supra Part V.B. 
198. See supra Part IV. 
199. SeesupraPartIlI.A. 
200. See supra Part VI.A. 
20 I. See supra Part Vl.B. 
202. See supra notes 48, 50 and accompanying text. 
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